The Islamic Republic has now had only two supreme leaders in its nearly five decades of existence. The first, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was the revolutionary visionary who conceptualized and led the overthrow of the Shah and established the theocratic system. The second, Ali Khamenei, was his chosen successor and custodian of a revolution he had not created. Now a third figure must be found — someone who will inherit a revolution they did not make and a war they did not start.
Khomeini’s death in 1989 was managed smoothly because it occurred during a period of relative stability and because Khamenei was a credible, if theologically modest, figure who commanded the confidence of the security establishment. The transition was orderly, and the system absorbed it without crisis.
The current transition is different in almost every respect. The Supreme Leader was killed rather than dying naturally. The country is at war. The domestic population is more alienated than at any point since 1979. The IRGC is more powerful than it was in 1989, and the role of the clerical establishment is correspondingly diminished.
The question of whether the third Supreme Leader will be a genuine religious authority or primarily a figurehead legitimizing IRGC power is the most consequential one facing the Islamic Republic. If it is the former, there is at least a theoretical possibility of the kind of authoritative leadership that can make hard decisions and reorient the state. If it is the latter, Iran is effectively becoming a military-dominated state with religious decoration.
Either way, the long arc of the Islamic Revolution has reached a decisive bend. The revolutionary generation that created the system is gone. What emerges in their place will define Iran — and the Middle East — for the next generation.